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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RICHARD M. GURULE, : Case No. 920099-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant relies on his opening brief and replies to the 
State's brief as follows. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Although the State articulates the correct standards of 
review (State's brief at 1-3), it attempts to chip away at this 
Court's responsibility in reviewing the ultimate conclusions for 
correctness. See State's brief at 12-14. 
The State's discussion about the "gate keeping functions of 
Ramirez" and the jury's role in determining reliability along with 
its concern about "overly intrusive appellate review" are 
superfluous. State's brief at 13. This Court has an obligation 
under both State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), and State v. 
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993), to review any underlying 
factual determinations under a clearly erroneous standard and to 
review the issue of "whether these facts are sufficient to 
demonstrate reliability" for correctness. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. 
The State has the burden in the trial court "of 
demonstrating the admissibility of the proferred evidence." 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778. In assessing whether the trial court's 
conclusion was correct, this Court must necessariLy consider whether 
the State met its burden below. 
A presumption of correctness does not attach to trial court 
conclusions of law as argued by the State. Nor does the appellate 
court give deference to the trial judge's ruling under a correctness 
review. See Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). 
Instead, this Court makes a de novo review to determine whether the 
trial court's conclusions were correct.1 See generally Bench v. 
Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1990). 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of li::e, 
liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States 
provides: 
1. The State cites State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982), 
for the proposition that the trial court's conclusion "deserves a 
presumption of correctness" on appeal. State's brief at 13. Jones 
actually says that the appellate court will "not presume either 
error or prejudice" and will "assume regularity in the 
proceedings." Jd. If this Court were to presume the correctness of 
a trial court decision rather than making a de novo review for 
correctnessf there would be little or no distinction between the 
clear error and correctness standards of review. 
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The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
REPLY TO STATE#S DISCUSSION OF NATURE OF ORDER 
The trial judge ruled in part: 
2. That the illegal entry and subsequent 
seizure of the defendant requires that all 
evidence acquired as a result of that illegal 
entry and seizure must be suppressed. 
3. That the failure of the West Valley 
Police Department to accurately record the 
initial descriptions given by the eyewitnesses, 
and the results of the "show-up" conducted in 
this case along with the suggestive circumstances 
of the "show-up" itself requires suppression 
under the guidelines articulated in State v. 
Ramirez, supra, Art. I, § 7, Utah State 
Constitution. 
The judge also ruled in an initialed minute entry: 
On the issue of whether eye witness 
identification evidence prior to illegal search 
and seizure is to be suppressed the Court rules 
that such evidence may properly be offered and 
admitted if otherwise competent, and is not to be 
suppressed as part of the Court's prior order. 
R. 126. 
The State claims that these rulings allow it to ask its 
witnesses during trial to make an in-court identification. However, 
the ruling explicitly allows "eyewitness identification evidence 
prior to illegal search and seizure." R. 126. Any in-court 
o 
identifications would be eyewitness identification evidence obtained 
after the illegal seizure and showup procedure. 
The State recognizes that the trial judge stated: "I will 
make it as clear as I can on the record that I havs no intention of 
suppressing any evidence, identification evidence oased upon events 
that occurred prior to the search." R. 370 (emphasis added); 
State's brief at 8. The judge also stated: 
". . .my finding that there may have been an 
improper search of the home did not in my opinion 
preclude the State from offering evidence of 
events prior to the search in order to go to 
trial on this matter. I would not have 
suppressed any of the evidence that occurred 
prior to the search, but only the subsequent 
fruits of that illegal search." 
R. 3 6 (emphasis added). The State's claim that it should be allowed 
to ask its witnesses to make in-court identifications after the 
search and showup does not follow from this statement. 
However, in the event this Court determines that there is 
an ambiguity in the order which might allow an in-court 
identification, the argument against admission of pre-seizure showup 
identification testimony made in this brief and Appellant's opening 
brief is equally applicable to any post-seizure/showup in-court 
identifications. The State failed to establish below that the 
witnesses have an independent, untainted memory of the assailant, 
and any in-court identification or description based on preseizure 
events is therefore not admissible. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Given the State's concessions and the evidence, Dorothy 
Knowlden should not be permitted to make an in-court identification 
of Appellant as being present at the scene, or to testify as to any 
description of a person at the scene which might be linked to 
Appellant. 
The State is precluded from offering testimony by Jody 
Knowlden which describes Appellant as a person at the scene or an 
in-court identification by Jody Knowlden. The State failed to 
present any testimony from Jody in response to Appellant's motion to 
suppress, and explicitly waived its opportunity to continue the 
hearing so as to allow Jody to testify. Under such circumstances, 
the State failed to establish its burden of showing that Jody was a 
witness who could provide reliable identification testimony which 
was untainted by the illegal showup/seizure. 
The State failed to establish that Eddy Knowlden had an 
independent, untainted memory of the assailant which was obtained 
prior to the illegal seizure/showup procedure. The State has failed 
to show this Court that the trial judge's finding that "the police 
failed to obtain or maintain any permanent record regarding 
descriptions of the assailant" prior to the showup was clearly 
erroneous as it pertained to Eddy. Indeed, there is no evidence of 
an independent, untainted description by Eddy. Hence, Eddy should 
not be permitted to describe the assailant or make an in-court 
identification. 
The State failed to establish below that Rodney Knowlden 
had an untainted memory of the assailant at the scene. Although 
Rodney filled out a form describing the assailant, there was 
contradictory evidence as to when the form was completed or obtained 
by officers. The trial judge was not obligated to believe Rodney's 
claim that he "filled out" the form before the showup. Nor did 
Rodney's testimony establish that the form was completed and given 
to officers, without any subsequent additions, before the showup. 
The State failed to establish that the trial court's finding 
regarding the State's failure to maintain and obtain preseizure 
descriptions was clearly erroneous. Instead, the State is 
essentially asking this Court to make a de novo factual finding 
despite the existence of evidence supporting the brial judge's 
finding. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT: ANY IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION AND \NY 
TESTIMONY REGARDING A DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSAILANT 
WHICH WAS OBTAINED PRIOR TO THE SUGGESTIVE SHOWUP 
AND ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED. 
In considering whether any "preseizure identification 
testimony" should be admissible in this case, two concepts should be 
kept in mind. First, the trial judge ruled that a suggestive showup 
and illegal search and seizure occurred. The impact of that 
suggestive procedure cannot be forgotten in analyzing whether the 
State established that the witnesses have an independent, untainted 
memory of what they saw at the time of the incident. Second, the 
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State had the burden of establishing the admissibility of 
identification testimony in the trial court. To the extent that it 
did not bring forth evidence below, it is precluded from arguing 
that such evidence can still be considered. 
The analysis of whether an in-court identification may be 
made or testimony regarding a pre-seizure/showup description may be 
given is slightly different depending on whether the taint of a 
suggestive procedure is being considered or whether the attenuation 
from an illegal search and seizure is being considered. In his 
opening brief, Mr. Gurule separated these arguments as subpoints A 
and B. This reply brief uses the same organizational approach. 
Mr. Gurule recognizes, however, that both analyses reach the same 
conclusion that the State failed to establish that its witnesses 
have distinct memories of the assailant which are untainted by the 
subsequent suggestive events. 
A. THE STATE DUE PROCESS VIOLATION WHICH 
OCCURRED AS THE RESULT OF THE SUGGESTIVE SHOWUP 
REQUIRES THAT ANY TESTIMONY REGARDING PRE-SHOWUP 
DESCRIPTIONS OR IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS BE 
SUPPRESSED. 
In its analysis of whether the taint of the suggestive 
showup requires suppression of any pre-seizure description or later 
in-court identification based on pre-seizure memories, the State 
seems to forget that the trial judge concluded that the showup 
procedure was suggestive and unreliable and that any testimony 
regarding that procedure would not be admissible. The issue, then, 
is whether, given the fact that these witnesses viewed Appellant 
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during that suggestive procedure, they can nevertheless retrieve an 
independent memory, unaffected by having viewed Appellant under 
those circumstances. 
1. Dorothy Knowlden Should Not Be Permitted to 
Describe the Assailant or Make an In-court 
Identification. 
Appellant accepts the State's concession that it "will not 
call Mrs. Knowlden to identify defendant as Dale Haddenham's 
assailant." State's brief at 9. Appellant would also request that, 
given the concessions by the State as to Mrs. Knowlden's lack of 
ability to identify the assailant, this Court clarify that 
Mrs. Knowlden is precluded from giving any "pre seizure" description 
or in-court identification of the assailant or any descriptions, 
identifications or insinuations that defendant was a person who may 
have been present at the scene. 
2. The State is Precluded from Presenting 
Identification Testimony by Jody Knowlden. 
Mr. Gurule filed his motion "to suppress statements of 
witnesses relating to their identification of RICHARD M. GURULE at 
the trial . . . and to suppress their in court identification of 
him." R. 20; see Addendum C in Appellant's opening brief. 
The State had "[t]he burden of demonstrating the 
admissibility of the proferred evidence is on the prosecution." 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778. The State attempted to sustain this 
burden below by proceeding first and calling various witnesses in 
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the trial court. See transcript of April 11, 1991 hearing. 
R. 147-367. 
The State did not call Jody Knowlden during this hearing 
and, in fact, explicitly stated that it did not want to continue the 
hearing in order to obtain testimony from Jody. R. 361-2. 
THE COURT: Did you mention the fact that there 
was one other witness you needed to call, 
Mr. [prosecutor]? 
PROSECUTOR: That was Mr. Jody Knowlden. 
Mr. Rodney Knowlden briefly mentioned he was also 
outside. He was at the preliminary hearing. 
[Defense counsel] has his testimony from the 
preliminary hearing, so he is not a surprise 
witness to [defense counsel]. 
THE COURT: Are you asking that we put this 
matter over so we can call this witness? 
PROSECUTOR: I think Mr. Jody Knowlden was 
further back from the porch. He saw what went 
on, but these two witnesses, Mr. Rodney Knowlden 
and Mr. Eddy Knowlden, were much closer, saw it 
much better. 
THE COURT: I am not sure I understand. Are you 
asking that we continue this matter so— 
PROSECUTOR: No. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry, all right. Everything is 
in? All right. 
PROSECUTOR: Yes, sir. 
The State's failure to call Jody Knowlden or produce 
evidence establishing the reliability and admissibility of any 
identification testimony from Jody Knowlden precludes it from going 
forward with any such testimony at this late date. The motion to 
suppress pertained to all witnesses, and the State's speculative, 
_ n 
eleventh hour claim in its appellate brief at 11, 23 that the State 
should still be permitted to introduce evidence regarding Jody 
Knowlden's identification testimony should not be entertained by 
this Court, especially under these circumstances where the State 
chose to forego such testimony below. 
3. The State Made No Showing in the Trial Court 
that Eddy Knowlden Could Give an Independent 
Description Which Was Unaffected by the 
Suggestive Procedure, 
The issue of whether the suggestive showup procedure 
tainted the pre-seizure description (or subseguent in-trial 
identification) revolves around the fourth Ramires; factor—whether 
the identification was the product of suggestion. 
The State had the burden in the trial court of establishing 
that Eddy Knowlden7s potential testimony was not the product of 
suggestion. Hence, the State's claim that ff[t]here is no evidence 
that Eddy's description was the product of improper suggestion" 
(State's brief at 21) begs the question. The issue is whether the 
State established that it was not the product of suggestion, not 
whether Appellant established the reverse. 
Again, it should be kept in mind that the trial judge 
initially determined that the showup procedure was; suggestive and 
unreliable. His subsequent order says in essence that despite this 
previous order, "eye witness identification evidence prior to 
illegal search and seizure" is admissible if othei*wise competent. 
R. 126. The first order regarding the suggestiveness of the 
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procedure is not at issue in this Court. The only issue for this 
Court is whether, given the existence of that suggestive procedure, 
the State should still be permitted to put on evidence of preseizure 
descriptions (and possibly, make in-court identifications based on a 
memory of those preseizure identifications). 
This is a state due process analysis under Ramirez. While 
federal cases may provide guidance, this Court is really concerned 
with whether Ramirez and State due process allow the State to put on 
such evidence where its witnesses have been impacted from seeing the 
defendant in a suggestive showup (see Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774; 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986) (recognizing that "as 
eye-witnesses wend their way through the criminal justice process, 
their reports of what was seen and heard tend to become "more 
accurate, more complete and less ambiguous")). 
This issue must be viewed with an understanding that our 
Supreme Court has recognized the fallibility of eyewitness 
identification and perceives Article I, section 7 of the Utah 
constitution as limiting the State's ability to introduce such 
evidence. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774; State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 
488-9 (Utah 1986). The Court has also recognized that one's ability 
to identify can be distorted by subsequent events, including 
exposure to the State's question. See Long, 721 P.2d at 494, n.8. 
In Ramirez, the Court did not address, but seemed to 
assume, that if the identification procedure were suggestive, any 
in-court identification or pre-showup description would not be 
admissible. Indeed, in most suggestive identification cases, the 
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assumption appears to be that where a witness is impacted by a 
suggestive procedure, he at the very least no longer has a clear, 
untainted memory upon which to make a later in-court identification. 
The trial judge in the present case founci 
13. That the police failed to obtain or 
maintain any permanent record regarding 
descriptions of the assailant given by tte 
eyewitnesses prior to the time the "show-up" 
occurred. 
14. That the police failed to recoid which 
of the eyewitnesses identified the defencant as 
the perpetrator of the assault.2 
R. 34-5. 
The State makes absolutely no attempt to establish that 
these findings are clearly erroneous as they relate to Eddy. Nor 
does the State make any attempt to marshal the evidence, as is 
required by this Court when a party attempts to attack a trial court 
finding. Hence, this Court should accept these findings as they 
relate to Eddy. 
Assuming that this Court accepts these findings as 
accurate, the State is unable to establish an independent memory on 
Eddy's part. The findings indicate that a record of any description 
2. Officer Mattfeld testified that only one witness, Mr. Knowlden, 
picked out Mr. Gurule as the assailant. R. 271, 278. He did not 
say whether this was Rodney, Eddy or Jody Knowlden. He did not 
record how many people or who attempted to identify Appellant. 
R. 277. The lack of record in this case as to who identified 
Appellant also works against including any identification 
testimony. It appears that, at best, only one of these witnesses 
was able to pick Mr. Gurule out of a suggestive showup. Allowing 
the others to subsequently point a finger during trial at the person 
sitting at the defense table would be fundamentally unfair under 
these circumstances. 
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was not obtained or maintained prior to the showup; obtaining a 
description after the showup was too late to establish that the 
description was unaffected by the procedure. 
Even if the Court goes behind these findings, despite the 
State's failure to marshal the evidence, it is apparent that these 
findings are adequately supported by the record and are not clearly 
erroneous. See Appellant's opening brief at 74. As the State 
acknowledges, it did not introduce a witness statement by Eddy. 
State's brief at 22. Whether such a statement exists, and whether 
it was taken prior to the showup, was a question of fact for the 
trial judge. 
Officer Mattfeld testified that he did not record 
descriptions and that there were no reports, apparently, of the 
preseizure descriptions. R. 280. He testified that statements were 
started after he entered the Gurule home but before the showup. 
There is no showing as to when they were completed, and they 
apparently were not begun until after the illegal seizure occurred. 
R. 275. Although Rodney testified that he filled out a written 
statement prior to the showup, the trial judge was not required to 
find this testimony credible, especially given the chaos described 
by the officers and the officers' inability to state when the 
descriptions were received. 
Further, Rodney's testimony does not demonstrate that Eddy 
completed a statement before the showup. Although Rodney testified 
that he began filling one out, he did not state whether it was 
completed before the showup, if at all. 
The absence of such a written description, coupled with the 
officer's testimony, demonstrates that the trial judge's finding 
that the officers failed to obtain or maintain any permanent record 
regarding descriptions of the assailant prior to the time the 
'showup' occurred" is not clearly erroneous.3 
In the absence of a clearly preserved pre-showup 
description, the State did not sustain its burden below to establish 
that any description testimony by Eddy would not be tainted by the 
subsequent events. 
4. Rodney Knowlden's Preseizure Identification 
Testimony Is Not Admissible. 
Again, the key to the admissibility of Rodney's testimony 
is whether the State established that Rodney had a distinct, 
untainted memory of the person. The State claims that Rodney's 
testimony that he "completed" his written report before the showup 
establishes that the finding was clearly erroneous. 
First, Rodney's testimony does not claim to have actually 
completed and given the report in this case to officers before the 
3. The State's claim that "[njothing in Ramirez requires written or 
otherwise recorded pre-showup identifications" misses the boat. In 
order to admit pre-seizure identification evidence, the State must 
establish that such identification is not the product of suggestion 
and is otherwise untainted. One way to do this might arguably be by 
somehow recording the exact nature of that pre-seizure description 
prior to the seizure. In this case, however, the Court found that 
the State did not "obtain or maintain" such descriptions, based 
primarily on the officer's testimony. A showing by the State that 
it had obtained and preserved such descriptions before the showup 
might be one way for the State to argue in a given case that a 
witness' ability to testify was not tainted by subsequent events. 
That did not occur in this case. 
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showup; nor was Rodney asked whether he made any additions to the 
statement after the showup. R. 233-4. Instead, Rodney simply 
testified that he "filled out" the statement before the showup. 
This does not establish, even if accepted as true, that a completed 
statement which was not later modified was given to police at that 
time. More importantly, the judge was not required to believe 
Rodney's claim that the form was filled out before the showup. 
Although Officer Mattfeld apparently gave the form to the witnesses 
shortly before the showup, his testimony demonstrated that the form 
was given to them after Officer Mattfeld entered the Gurule home. 
R. 275. The statements were not actually taken from witnesses 
before the showup, and officers "had a poor identification as to who 
they were as far as just physical descriptions." R. 290. 
The State called four police officers to testify: Officers 
Mattfeld, Ivino, Acocks, and Call. R. 260, 294, 318, 325. These 
were the only officers identified by name. R. 295.4 None of these 
officers testified that they took statements from the witnesses 
prior to the showup. In fact, three of them were not involved in 
that procedure. R. 3 07, 321, 325, 326. 
Officer Mattfeld was the only officer who testified that he 
talked to the witnesses before the showup. R. 262. He made a 
quick, initial investigation. R. 263. Then he "had the other 
4. Officer Mattfeld could not remember all of the officers or the 
order in which they arrived. R. 263. He thought Officers Ivino, 
Call and Acocks were present plus two reserve officers and an 
officer from Granite School police. R. 263. The State did not call 
the last three officers to testify. 
— TK 
officers obtain some information from them." R. ;>67. None of these 
other officers testified regarding what information they might have 
obtained. 
Officer Mattfeld testified that the written statements were 
"started" after he entered the Gurule home but before the showup. 
R. 275. He did not say who started such statements nor when they 
were completed. He did not include any information received in his 
report and could not remember any such information. R. 280. Under 
these circumstances, the judge's finding that officers did not 
obtain and maintain descriptions before the illegal seizure/showup 
is supported by the evidence. 
Finally, the description by Rodney is no<: detailed. While 
it indicates a short, heavy set person, it includes no facial or 
hair descriptions other than a statement that the person had a small 
beard. Many people are short and heavy set with beards.5 
The State has failed to show that the judge's finding that 
the State had not obtained or maintained an independent description 
was clearly erroneous. That finding precludes a conclusion that 
Rodney has an independent recollection from which to testify. 
5. The testimony about blood on the shirt occurred at the hearing 
on the motion (R. 238) and thus was not preserved as pre-showup 
evidence. Rodney may well have assimilated this Information into 
his memory after talking with witnesses and viewing the suggestive 
identification procedure. The State's claim that this evidence 
supports its argument that preseizure identification evidence should 
be admissible demonstrates the difficulty with the judge's 
bifurcated ruling in this case. This testimony should be 
disregarded in evaluating this issue since Rodney may well have 
obtained the information during the suggestive showup procedure. 
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B. THE ILLEGAL SEIZURE REQUIRES SUPPRESSION OF 
PRESEIZURE IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE AND 
POST-SEIZURE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY. 
The failure to obtain and maintain a record of what Eddy 
and Rodney saw and could testify to before they were tainted by 
seeing Mr. Gurule in the suggestive procedure after the illegal 
seizure precludes admission of any identification testimony by these 
witnesses. 
The State's circuitous argument that the fact that Rodney 
and Eddy promptly selected Mr. Gurule from the suggestive showup 
evidences a disregard for the concerns regarding eyewitness 
identifications which were outlined in Long and Ramirez. The State 
attempts to use the results of the showup, already suppressed due to 
their unreliability, to convince this Court that Eddy and Rodney 
have an independent "clear memory" of the assailant. Such reasoning 
is not persuasive; the selection at the showup and claims of a 
changed shirt are tainted by the procedures. The State has not 
established that independent memories are working here. 
In State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 27 (Utah 1992), 
the Court addressed whether a second consent given by the defendant 
to open a storage unit was sufficiently attenuated from an illegal 
search. The Court looked at "the purpose and flagrancy of the 
police conduct" and whether there could be "a clean break in the 
chain of events between the conduct and the second consent." The 
Court also considered the lapse of time and other factors in 
determining whether the consent was valid. 
In the present case, the issue is whether the State 
established that Rodney and Eddy could give independent, untainted 
testimony. The Thurman analysis provides very little guidance in 
assessing this issue. 
The State's failure to establish that either Rodney or Eddy 
has an independent, untainted memory of the assailant precludes 
admission of any description of the assailant or in-court 
identification. 
The fourth amendment violation along with the due process 
violation requires suppression of any preseizure description or 
post-seizure in-court identification. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court order allowing evidence of "pre-seizure" identification 
testimony, and remand the case for trial absent "pre-seizure 
identification" testimony or in-court identification testimony. 
SUBMITTED this l i t day of May, 1993. 
<jfatc<)tzfr 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
F&TRICK L. AhDERSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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